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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Prater appealed from his judgment of conviction for felony domestic battery of his
girlfriend, Ms. Barnett. On appeal, Mr. Prater argued that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements about the battery because she made the
statements after she had a motive to lie, thus rendering the statements inadmissible pursuant to
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Mr. Prater further argued the State could not prove this error was harmless,
and therefore he requested this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case for
a new trial. The State responded. Mr. Prater now replies.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Prater’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–2.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by
reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements
to rebut a charge of recent fabrication because her motive to lie preceded her statements?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Ms. Barnett’s Prior Consistent
Statements To Rebut A Charge Of Recent Fabrication Because Her Motive To Lie Preceded Her
Statements
On appeal, Mr. Prater argued the district court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay
under the prior consistent statements exception contained in I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). (App.
Br., pp.4–10.) This rule allows the admission of a declarant’s prior consistent statement “to rebut
an express or implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive.” I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). In applying this rule, this Court has made clear that the hearsay
statements must be made “prior to the time when the declarant would have a motive to lie.”
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 14 (2013). Here, the district court admitted Ms. Barnett’s prior
consistent statements (via testimony from her sister (“Letisa”) and Officer Hemmert), but Ms.
Barnett made these statements after she had a motive to lie. Accordingly, Mr. Prater argued on
appeal these statements were improperly admitted by the district court.
In response, the State attempts to dilute this evidentiary rule by arguing that prior
consistent statements are admissible—even if they are made after the declarant had a motive to
lie—as long as there were additional motives to lie that arose after the statements. (See Resp.
Br., pp.4–10.) In other words, according to the State, a prior consistent statement made after
some motives to lie, but before others, is admissible. (Resp. Br., pp.4–10.) As such, because
Ms. Barnett may have developed additional motives to lie after her first motive, her statements
made in between the development of these disparate motives were admissible. (Resp. Br., pp.4–
10.) This is not the rule, and this Court should decline to accept the State’s position.
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A timeline concerning the alleged criminal conduct, Ms. Barnett’s statements, and her
alleged motives may be useful. This timeline plainly demonstrates Ms. Barnett had a motive to
lie when she made the prior consistent statements:
•

Mr. Prater allegedly injuries Ms. Barnett on December 24. (See Tr., p.104, L.10–p.106,
L.20.)

•

Next, Mr. Prater throws an alcoholic drink on Ms. Barnett as she tries to leave, and he
threatens to call the police to report her for driving under the influence (“DUI”), which
would cause Ms. Barnett to “lose” the kids. (Tr., p.106, L.21–p.107, L.25, p.137, Ls.2–
22.) (first motive to lie)

•

Shortly thereafter, Letisa picks up Ms. Barnett, and Letisa testifies that Ms. Barnett told
her: “She said that they had recently gotten into a fight, that he threw a drink in her face,
and he called her in for a DUI.” (Tr., p.155, Ls.1–3.) (prior consistent statement)

•

Ms. Barnett leaves, but returns to the next day, December 25. Mr. Prater allegedly injures
her again. (Tr., p.109, L.8–p.112, L.22.) (State’s second proposed motive to lie)

•

Mr. Prater briefly leaves the house on December 25 or 26. (Tr., p.113, Ls.24–25, p.140,
Ls.4–7.) (State’s third proposed motive to lie)1

•

Police officers come to the house on December 25 or 26, and Ms. Barnett does not report
the battery. (Tr., p.112, L.22–p.113, L.6, p.138, L.12–p.139, L.1.)

•

On December 27, Ms. Barnett’s co-workers observe bruises and encourage her to go to
the police. (Tr., p.114, Ls.22–23, p.115, L.17–p.118, L.5.) (State’s fourth proposed
motive to lie)

•

Later on December 27, Ms. Barnett reports the incident to Officer Hemmert, and Officer
Hemmert testifies that Ms. Barnett told him that she was injured by Mr. Prater, her
children were present, and he threw a drink on her. (Tr., p.115, Ls.5–13, p.162, L.7–
p.163, L.11.) (prior consistent statement)

•

Ms. Barnett and Mr. Prater argue via text message after the incidents until February.
(Tr., p.141, L.10–p.144, L.23.) (State’s fifth proposed motive to lie)

As evidenced by this timeline, Ms. Barnett made the prior consistent statements to Letisa and
Officer Hemmert after she had at least one motive to lie. Indeed, her statements to Officer

1

The State refers to this as a “breakup”; however, there is no testimony to support this
characterization.
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Hemmert came after four motives to lie, according to the State. Further, the State does not
dispute that Ms. Barnett developed her first motive to lie after Mr. Prater threw the alcoholic
drink on her. The State only argued Ms. Barnett developed more motives to lie as the incident
went on. Her first motive, however, was uncontested. As such, the State has all but conceded that
Ms. Barnett made her prior consistent statements to Letisa and Officer Hemmert before one and
four motives to lie, respectively. The admission of her prior consistent statements, therefore,
were plainly in violation of I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) and this Court’s holding in Joy.
Moreover, the State provides no legal authority for its proposed rule that the declarant
must have made the prior consistent statement before all motives to lie to be inadmissible.
“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they
will not be considered.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (citing Idaho Appellate Rule
35; Langley v. State Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 784 (1995)). “A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.” Id.
Without legal authority for the State’s approach, the State has waived this new theory.
Even if the State’s theory is considered, it falls apart upon close examination of these
other alleged motives developed by Ms. Barnett after her initial motive to lie. First, the State
maintains Ms. Barnett developed a second motive to lie from Mr. Prater’s alleged “additional
violence” after the first incident. (Resp. Br., p.7.) Under this theory, Ms. Barnett was motivated
to lie about the first incident because Mr. Prater injured her the next day. Mr. Prater’s counsel,
however, never implied in cross-examination that Ms. Barnett fabricated the first incident, but
not the second. (See Tr., p.133, L.10–p.145, L.23.) If anything, Mr. Prater’s counsel implied that
Ms. Barnett fabricated both incidents. (See Tr., p.133, L.10–p.145, L.23.) Therefore, the State’s
second proposed motive to lie fails.
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Second, the State contends Ms. Barnett developed a third motive to lie because Mr. Prater
left their house at some point during the incidents (“the breakup”). (Resp. Br., p.7.) Under this
theory, presumably, Ms. Barnett was motivated to lie about one or both of the incidents because
she was angry that Mr. Prater temporarily left her.2 Yet Mr. Prater’s counsel never implied any
recent fabrication motivated by Mr. Prater’s short-lived departure from their house. (Tr., p.139,
L.23–p.140, L.7.) Rather, Mr. Prater’s counsel briefly cross-examined Ms. Barnett about an
inconsistency in her testimony in comparison to the police report:
Q. Okay. Now, you indicated that you left, right, versus Jose leaving the property?
A. On what day? I’m sorry.
Q. Whatever day you called the police and they showed up. Was it the 25th or
26th?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the police report indicates that he had left the property and that you
stayed there, which would be correct?
A. He left and I also left.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. So he left, and then you leave with the kids?
A. Yes.
(Tr., p.139, L.23–p.140, L.10.) This cross-examination did not expressly or impliedly charge
Ms. Barnett with recent fabrication. It simply focused on an inconsistency in her testimony.
Effective cross-examination does not automatically rise to the level of charging the witness with

2

This alleged motive is bizarre because, based on Ms. Barnett’s testimony, she clearly wanted to
get away from Mr. Prater with the children, evidenced by her first leaving with Letisa on
December 24, (Tr., p.106, L.21–p.109, L.7), calling the police on him on December 25,
(Tr., p.112, Ls.13–24), and leaving again to stay with her parents on December 25 until work on
December 27, (Tr., p.114, Ls.3–23). Nothing in Ms. Barnett’s testimony implied that she was
jilted by Mr. Prater leaving her and thus motivated to lie about the alleged incidents.
6

recent fabrication of the incident. Thus, this motive to lie also fails.
Third, the State maintains Ms. Barnett developed a fourth motive to lie because her coworkers encouraged her to report her bruises to the police. (Resp. Br., p.7.) For one, this motive
is wholly unsupported by the cross-examination of Ms. Barnett. Mr. Prater’s counsel never
questioned Ms. Barnett about her interaction with her co-workers. (See Tr., p.133, L.10–p.145,
L.23.) There was no charge of recent fabrication based on Ms. Barnett’s co-worker’s
encouragement. Moreover, it stretches the bounds of credulity to say Ms. Barnett developed a
motive to lie from her co-workers’ encouragement. The only theory that Mr. Prater can surmise
is that Ms. Barnett was motivated to lie about the injuries because Ms. Barnett did not want her
co-workers to know the actual cause of her bruises. This theory is nonsensical. And was never
implied by Mr. Prater at trial. Ms. Barnett’s interaction with her co-workers was not a motive to
lie. This motive fails.
Fourth, the State asserts Ms. Barnett developed a fifth and final motive to lie because
Mr. Prater argued with her via text message. (Resp. Br., p.7.) Under this theory, Ms. Barnett was
motivated to lie about the incidents because she was angry, annoyed, or otherwise unhappy with
Mr. Prater and their contentious relationship. Although this may have been another motive for
Ms. Barnett to lie, it does not eliminate or diminish her initial motive. A declarant can have more
than one motive, and the existence of a subsequent motive does not negate the first. Here,
Ms. Barnett’s statement to Letisa was relevant to the first alleged incident on December 24, and
thus this statement was necessarily used to rebut a charge of recent fabrication of the first
incident. But, at the time Ms. Barnett made the statement, she already had a motive to lie:
Mr. Prater had thrown an alcoholic drink on her and called 911 to report her for a DUI so she
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could not drive away with the children. (Tr., p.106, L.23–p.107, L.24.) During crossexamination, Mr. Prater’s counsel asked her:
Q. Okay. Now, would you say that it would not be safe to be driving drunk with
kids in a car? Would you agree with me?
A. Absolutely.
[Overruled objection by prosecutor]
Q. . . . : That made you mad, didn’t it?
A. No.
Q. It did not make you mad? Didn’t upset you at all?
A. What didn’t upset me?
Q. That he called the police on you.
A. Oh, no.
Q. Did you call him out on it?
A. No.
(Tr., p.137, Ls.7–22.) This is clearly an implicit charge of fabrication of the first incident due to
Ms. Barnett’s anger with Mr. Prater for calling the police for a DUI. As such, her statement to
Letisa was inadmissible since it was made after Ms. Barnett formed her motive to lie. The
presence of a later motive to lie (or to keep the lie going) does not allow the admission of her
first statement made directly after and clearly linked to her first motive.
In sum, the presence of other motives to lie, whether legitimate or not, does not defeat
Mr. Prater’s challenge to the district court’s admission of Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent
statements. Ms. Barnett had a strong, specific motive to lie before she made the prior consistent
statement to Letisa, and Ms. Barnett had at least one and up to four motives to lie (according to
the State) before she made the prior consistent statements to Officer Hemmert. Again, the State
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does not dispute these motives. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and in Mr. Prater’s
Appellant’s Brief, he maintains the district court failed to act consistently with the legal
standards and thus abused its discretion by admitting Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements.
(App. Br., pp.4–10.)
Lastly, the State has not met its burden to show the admission of improper evidence was
harmless. To satisfy this standard, the State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error
did not contribute to the verdict actually obtained.3 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010).
The State did not meet its burden. The State generally maintains these hearsay statements were
redundant, helpful to the defense, or minimally relevant because the pictures of Ms. Barnett’s
injuries were “the most important and telling evidence” (Resp. Br., pp.9, 10-11.) Yet, in closing
argument, the prosecutor did not argue to the jury that the pictures were the most important and
telling evidence of the charged offense and that these witnesses’ statements were mostly
irrelevant. Rather, the prosecutor repeatedly argued to the jury that Ms. Barnett was credible. The
prosecutor argued, for example, that Ms. Barnett’s inability to answer questions during crossexamination “does not mean she was not telling the truth.” (Tr., p.251, L.22-p.252, L.1.) When
discussing Ms. Barnett’s memory, the prosecutor claimed:
And what did she remember? We talked about this in jury selection. What do
people remember about traumatic events? They remember the main event. They
remember the big things. All the little details, maybe not perfectly. And she was
honest about that.
3

The State also asserts that an error “is harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the
challenged evidence.” (Resp. Br., p.8 (quoting State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887
(Ct. App. 2005)). This, however, is not the appropriate standard of review. “[A]n appellate
court’s inquiry ‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
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(Tr., p.254, Ls.16-21 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor also told the jury that Mr. Prater “told
you on the stand that he lied” to law enforcement about Ms. Barnett “being drunk and driving.”
(Tr., p.255, L.24-p.256, L.3.) Mr. Prater had “a completely different version of the events,
completely,” according to the prosecutor. (Tr., p.256, Ls.12-14.) The prosecutor asked the jury:
And you have competing versions of what took place. You have to make a
determination of what the truth is. Fortunately, you also have corroboration. You
have other pieces of evidence to help you, and you have the ability to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. It’s within you duty to determine the truthfulness of
the witnesses.
(Tr., p.257, L.20-p.258, L.1.) Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor told the jury:

“Maybe it’s

because it’s the truth. [Ms. Barnett’s] being honest. She’s saying what happened. As opposed to
the defendant’s account where he didn’t touch her at all ever. Didn’t do anything.” (Tr., p.258,
Ls.19-22.) He argued that she had “no apparent motive” to fabricate a story. (Tr., p.258, L.23p.159, L.3.) The prosecutor also said, “You get to judge her credibility.” (Tr. p.259, Ls.13-14.)
As evident from the prosecutor’s closing argument, this case came down to a credibility
determination between Ms. Barnett and Mr. Prater. The pictures were only one part of the State’s
evidence to corroborate Ms. Barnett’s testimony, which the jury had to believe to find Mr. Prater
guilty. The other corroborating evidence consisted of Letisa’s and Officer Hemmert’s testimony.
Their testimony of Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements was neither redundant nor helpful to
the defense. To the contrary, it was extremely beneficial to the prosecution. It bolstered
Ms. Barnett’s credibility and supported the State’s version of the incidents. With the hearsay
statements from Letisa and Officer Hemmert to validate Ms. Barnett’s testimony on the one hand
and Mr. Prater’s testimony on the other, it was three against one. Examining what “actually”
happened at trial, the State has failed to show that the erroneous admission of evidence that
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directly bolstered the complaining victim’s testimony was surely unattributable to the jury’s
guilty verdict. Joy, 155 Idaho at 1.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Prater respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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